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In the Supreme Court
of the State of Utah

RcsJwnrlent,

t

YS.

J~-\.CK

Case No.
7371

L. CLARK,
Appellant. )

RESPONDENT'S BRIEF

STATEMENT OF FACTS
This is an appeal by the defendant, Jack L. Clark,
from the verdict of the jury and the judgment of the
court convicting him ·of the crime of involuntary manslaughter arising out of an automobile accident which
occurred on December 16, 1948, at approximately 11:30
p.m.
Appellant's brief summarizes very completely the
evidence and testimony which was presented to the Court
and jury upon which the conviction was based. Respon3
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dent will therefore refrain from making an independent
presentation of the facts at this time but will do so where
nescessary in view of the fact that appellant relies
for a reversal of the judgment of conviction partly on
the ground that, as he contends, the evidence was insufficient to show that defendant was guilty of "reckless
conduct or conduct evincing a marked disregard for
the safety of others.''

STATEMENT OF POINTS
I. The evidence was sufficient to sustain the verdict.
II. The Court did not prejudicially instruct the jury
concerning the alleged acts of willful or wanton misconduct.
III. The Court properly refused to give defendant's
requested instruction No. 2.

ARGUMENT

I.
THE EVIDENCE WAS SUFFICIENT TO SUSTAIN THE
VERDICT.

In his brief appellant argues that there was ins:uffcient evidence from which the jury could conclude
either:
(a) That the defendant drove his automobile at a
speed greater than was reasonable and prudent, having
4
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il

regard for the actual and potential' hazards then exist~
ing; or
(b) That the defendant drove his automobile to the
left of the center of the highway in an attempt to over ..
take and pass another vehicle proceeding in the same
direction.
In detennining whether or not defendant drove
his car at a rate of sp€ed greater than was reasonable
and prudent under the conditions and having regard
for the actual and potential hazards then existing, it
must be remembered that regardless of the actual speed
of defendant's car, which was never accurately determined because the Sp€edometer was not working, the uncontroYerted testimony in the record shows that the highway was icy and slippery and that the defendant drove
his car knowing this and also that the rear tires were worn
smooth, and consequently he did not have good traction.
Furthermore, the defendant admitted he had been drinking some beers earlier in the evening, which fact could
certainly be considered in determining the reasonableness or unreasonableness of the rate of speed at which
defendant was driving under the circumstances. In
addition, the physical evidence at the scene of the accident could properly be considered, together with all the
other evidence and testimony, in determining whether
or not, under the circumstances, the speed at which defendant was driving was reasonable or unreasonable.

It is respectfully submitted that there was ample and
sufficient testimony and evidence presented which justi)
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fied the Court in submitting the issue of speed to the
jury.
With reference to the matter of submitting question
of issuable fact to the jury, it is stated in 61 0. J. 8.,
beginning at page 800, that:

"* * * in prosecutions for homicides occasioned through the operation of motor vehicles
and for assault with intent to kill or murder, ordinarily it is the province of the court to determine
questions of law, and that of the jury to determine,
under proper instructions, issues of fact, such as
the weight to be given the evidence and the credibility of the witnesses. Where there is evidence
on which th jury may justifiably find the existence or nonexistence of any material facts in
issue, and the evidence is conflicting or of such
a character that different conclusions may reasonably be drawn therefrom, the issues should be
submited to the jury.
''In numerous cases various issues have been
held questions of fact for the jury, such as * * * ;
the speed or excessive or unlawful speed of accused's motor vehicle; whether accused was driving on the wrong side, or over the center line,
of the highway, * * * ''
Also, in 5 Am. Jur. at page 882 it is stated that:

I

I

"* * * It is generally for the jury to decide
whether the speed of the vehicle proximately contributed to the accident, and whether such speed
was excessive, considering in connection therewith
the hazards of the surrounding circumstances.''
This Honorable Court held in St;ate v. Lake, 196 P.
1015, 57 Utah 619, a case which involved a prosecution
6
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~t

for involuntary manslaughter, that the question of whether or not the defendant's automobile was running at
a dangerous or excessiYe rate of speed at the time it
struck and killed deceased was e;rclusi.vely a jury question. In the course of the opinion it was said :
· · "\Yhether or not the defendant's car was
running at a dangerous or excessive rate of speed
was a question exclusiYely for the jury under the
facts of the instant case. The witness 0. C. Anderson, after duly qualifying as to his con1petency
to express an opinion, testified that in his opinion
defendant's car, when it struck the boy, was
running at a speed of 40 miles an hour. Defendant's witnesses testified tht the speedometer
on the car indicated only 23 or 24 miles an hour.
Under these circumstances we are not prepared to
hold as a matter of la-w that there was no substantial evidence to support the charge that the speed
was in excess of 25 miles an hour. Besides this,
there was also evidence to the effect that the
boy was thrown by the impact a distance of 25
or 30 feet, and that the car continued on its
course for a distance of 200 feet before it was
stopped. These circumstances had a bearing upon
the question of speed and were no doubt considered by the jury in arriving at a conclusion."
See also Steff ani v. State, 45 Ariz. 210, 42 P. (2d) 615;
People v. Flores, 83 CA 2d. 11, 187 P. (2d) 910; Cowart
v. Lewis, 151 Miss. 221, 117 So. 531, 61 A.L.R. 1229;
Whiting v. Andrus, 173 Ore.133, 144 P. (2d) 501.
With reference to the matter of sufficient evidence
to prove that defendant drove his automobile to the left
of the center of the highway it is respectfully submitted
7
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that this too was a question for the jury, which the jury
decided adversely to the defendant. It will be noted that
the jury was instructed in Instruction No. 7 that:
''Before you are warranted in ·convicting the
defendant the State must prove beyond a reasonable doubt * * *
(2) that* * *,or that he drove his automobile to the left side of the center of the roadway
* * *"
And again in Instruction No. 14 that :
'' * * * to warrant you in convicting the defendant, the evidence must, to your minds, exclude
every reasonable hypothesis other than that of
the guilt of the defendant. That is to say, if after
an entire consideration and comparison of all the
testimony in the case, you can reasonably explain
the facts given in evidence on any reasonable
ground other than the guilt of the defendant, you
should acquit him.''
In considering the evidence as to whether or not the defendant drove his automobile to the left of the center of
the roadway, in the light of the aforesaid instructions the
jury must necessarily have convinced themselves beyond
a reasonable doubt that the defendant did in fact drive
his automobile to the left of the center of the roadway.
As stated in
61 Wyo. 231, 157
upon the driver on
cuse or justify the

the case of Wallis v. :Nauman,
P. 2d 285: ":H; * * The burden is
the wrong side o~ the road to .exviolation of the law of the road.''
8
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I

It is respectfully subnritted that this was a jury question
and that the defendant failed to meet the burden of
proof placed upon him to excuse or justify the presence
of the automobile he was driving at the time of the accident on the wrong side of the highway. In this connection see also the cases of State v. Birch, ·183 Wash.
670, -!9 P. (2d) 921; State v. Riddle, ______ Utah------, 188 P.
2d -!-19: Hozcard v. Sta.te, ------- Okla. ------, 199 P. (2d) 240.

It is submitted likewise that the · Court did not
commit prejudici3:l error in denying defendant's motion
for a dismissal on the grounds that the evidence was
insufficient to submit to the jury. As held by this Honorable Court in the case of State v. Thatcher, 108 Utah 63,
157 P. (2d) 258:
''The rule which must be applied upon a motion to dismiss a criminal case is that all reasonable inferences are to be taken in favor of the
state, and only if the record itself reveals that
no reasonable man could draw an inference of
guilt therefrom is the trial court justified in taking the case from the jury.'' ·
Respondent respectfully submits that no such case is
presented here but that there was sufficient evidence to
submit to the jury on the question of whether defendant
operated his automobile at an excessive rate of speed
in view of the actual and potential hazards then existing, and also sufficient evidence to submit to the jury on
the question of whether the defendant operated his automobile on the wrong side of the highway.
9
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II.
THE COURT DID NOT PREJUDICIALLY INSTRUCT
THE JURY CONCERNING THE ALLEGED ACTS OF WILLFUL OR WANTON MISCONDUCT.

It is argued by the appellant that the verdict of
the jury cannot be sustained because the Court failed
to instruct the jury that before they could find the defendant guilty, they must unanimously determine that he
was guilty of willful or wanton misconduct as to one or
both of the alleged grounds of negligence set forth in
the Court's instructions. Instruction No. 7, the one
complained of, reads as follows:
''Before you are warranted in convicting the
defendant, the State must prove beyond a reasonable doubt the following:
(1) That the defendant, Jack L. Clark,
drove an automobile on or about the 16th day
of December, 1948, upon a highway in Salt Lake
County, State of Utah.
(2) That he drove the automobile at a rate
of speed greater than was reasonable and prudent
under the conditions and having regard to the
actual and potential hazards then existing, or that
he drove an automobile to the left side of the
center of the roadway while overtaking and passing another vehicle proceeding in the same direction at a time when the left-hand side of the
highway was not free of oncoming traffic for such
a sufficient distance ahead as to permit him to
complete· the pass and return to the right-hand
side of the highway in time to avoid a collision
with an automobile proceeding in the opposite
direction. That in committing one or both of the
10
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1 .;

!:

acts set forth herein the defendant was g·uilty of
crin1inal negligence as defined herein.
(3) That as a result of the manner in which
the defendant unlawfully drove his car, if you so
find, John D. Cutler was killed without malice.
(-!) That the manner in 'vhich the defendant
drove his autmnobile as set forth in paragraph
(2) was the proxilnate cause or proximately contributed to the death of John D. Cutler.

It is not enough that the State prove one
or more of the elements set forth above, but it is
necesary in order to justify a verdict of guilty
that each of the four elements set forth above be
proved to your satisfaction and beyond a reasonable doubt.''
Appellant admits that no request for a clarifying
instruction was submitted but attempts to justify this
on the ground that under his theory of the ·case there
was insufficient evidence to go to the jury, particularly
on the matter of whether defendant was attempting to
pass other vehicles. The general rule with reference to
the necessity of requesting more explicit instructions
is set forth in 53 .Am. Jur. at page 414 as follows:
''Even though the trial court may be required
to give general instructions on the issues without
request from counsel, it is generally considered
to be the duty of counsel to assist the court in the
function of instructing the jury. It is an established general ru1e that when a party is of the
opinion that the instructions given by the court
are not explicit enough upon certain points or do
not cover all phases of the case, he should call
the attention of the court to that fact, and tender
11
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other and fuller instructions or request the -court
to give such further instructions as he desires;
otherwise he cannot predicate error upon omis~
sions in the charge as given.''
As to the application of this general rule in homicide
cases see 26 Am. Jur. 522, Homicide, Sec. 528.
It is submitted that if appellant was entitled to the
type of instruction concerning which he now complains,
its was the duty of counsel for appellant to have presented such an instruction to the court and asked that it
be given. His failure in this respect, regardless of the
reason now proffered for such neglect, precludes appellant from now complaining of the failure of the Court
in not giving such an instruction. Moreover it is respectfully submitted that the cases cited by appellant in support if his Point No. 2 do not substantiate the principle
relied upon to set aside the verdict.
A careful reading of State v. Johnson, 76 Utah 84,
287 P. 909, cited by appellant, reveals that the case was
reversed, among other reasons, not because it could
not be determined whether or not the jurors unanimously agreed upon one or more of the several acts of
negligence with which defendant was charged, but because the trial court submitted the question of intoxication to the jury. The Court held that this was prejudicial
and reversible error because there was not sufficient
evidence to show that the defendant was under the influence of intoxicating liquor at the time of the automobile
accident and therefore that that issue should not have
be~n submitted to the jury.
12
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'Yhile a casual reading of State v. Rasmussen, 92
Utah 357, 68 P. (2d) 176, and State v. Bleaz.ard, 103 Utah
13, 133 P. (2d) 1000, the other two cases cited by appellant in support of his Point No. 2, would appear at
first blush to support the principle for which appellant
argues, a careful reading of those cases and the later
cases of State v. Roedl, 107 Utah 538, 155 P. (2d) 741,
and State v. Thompson, 110 Utah 113, 170 P. (2d) 153,
discloses that tlris Honorable Court did not enunciate
that principle. In the course of the opinion in the
Thompson case (supra), involving a question of first
degree murder, it was said:
•' The case was submited to the jury on two
theories of murder in the first degree : 1. That
the killing 'was intentional, deliberate and premeditated and done with malice aforethought.'
2. That the killing 'was perpetrated by an act
greatly dangerous to the lives of others, evidencing a depraved mind regardless of human life.'
After the evidence was in the defendant moved
the court to require the state to elect on which
one of these theories of murder in the first degree
it would stand, and assigns as error the court's
refusal to grant that motion. Counsel, however,
does not argue that it was error to submit both of
these theories to the jury, but contends that under
the instructions given the jury was authorized
to find the defendant guilty of murder in the first
degree, if all jurors were satisfied that he was
guilty thereof, even though some of them believed
him guilty only under one theory and others
believed him guilty only under the other theory.
To the effect that such instruction would be erroneous he quotes from State v. Roedl, 107 Utah

13
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538, 155 P. 2d 741, 747, where referring to St·ate
v. Ra.smussen, 92 Utah 357, 68 P. 2d 176, we said:
'While we held in that case in a prosecution for involuntary manslaughter wherein several unlawful acts, such as driving at an unlawful
rate of speed, driving without a proper lookout,
and others, were alleged to have been committed
resulting in death, the jury must unanimously
agree on one or more of the specified unlawful
acts and they may not combine their conclusions
on different specified acts so as to converge on an
ultimate verdict of guilty.'
There is doubt that the Rasmussen case really
holds what we in the Roedl case said it did. In
the opinion first appearing in the Rasmussen
case, written by Mr. Justice :Moffat and concurred
in by :Mr. Justice Ephraim Hanson, it was stated
as their opinion that the jury must agree unanimously on one or more of the specified unlawful
acts, and that the judgment of the trial court
should be reversed on that account but that was
not the opinion of a majority of the court. Each
of the other three Justices wrote a separate
opinion but none of such separate opinions definitely holds that all of the jurors must unanin1ously agree on one or more of the specified
unlawful acts but simply hold, without deciding
that question, that even if that is the law the
jury was sufficiently instructed to that effect in
that case. Nor was that question determined in
the Roedl case. There we held that regardless of
what the law is on that question no prejudicial
error was committed because the evidence was
so conclusive on the question of a deliberate and
premeditated killing that the jury could not have
been misled thereby.
14
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It is also not necessarY for us to deeide that
q1.wstiPn and we therefore· do not decide it here.
Counsel. to sustain his contention that the court
authorized the jury to find the defendant guilty
of 1nurder in the first degree. even though some
found him g·uilty only under one theory and others
found hin1 guilty only under the other theory,
relies on the following instruction :

•Before you nu1y find the defendant guilty
of Inluder in the first degree, all of the jurors
must concur as to either one or the other of the
kinds of murder above referred to * * *'
That statement says in effect that before the
is authorized to find the defendant guilty
of murder in the first degree all of the jurors
must concur in finding him guilty under one theory or all of them must concur in finding hin1
guilty under the other theory. Almost the exact
words used in this instruction are used with that
meaning in some of the opinions in the Rasmussen
case. It is clear that this is the correct construction
when we consider the fact that the court is cautioning the jury that: Before they may find the
defendant guilty of murder in the first degree
'all of the jurors must concur as to either one o.r
the other of the kinds of murder above referred
to.'
jur~-

On the other hand, a different meaning would
have been indicated had the court said: That all
that is necessary in order to find the defendant
guilty of murder in the first degree is that' all of
the jurors must concur as to either one or the
other of the kinds of murder above referred to.'
The italicized portions of the above sentences,
as indicated, are directly quoted from the instruction, and are the same in both sentences but by
15
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the change in the previous context and a change
in the emphasis placed on the words, a different
meaning is obtained. The fact that the court is
cautioning the jury, that in determining its verdict, it must observe the limitations therein stated,
rather than suggesting that such limitations are
unimportant clearly indicates an intention to limit
the jury in finding the defendant guilty of murder in the first degree to a situation where all
the jurors unanimously concurred in such finding
on the same theory of such murder. Thus the instructions of the court were in accord with what
the defendant contends they should have been.''
In connection with this same matter, th~ attention
of this Honorable Court is invited to the holding of the
Supreme Court of the State of Montana in the recent
case of State v. Souhra.da (1949), ________ Mont. ________ , 204
P. (2d) 792. The case involved a prosecution of a motorist for involuntary manslaughter in which he was charged
with several acts of specific negligence in the operation
of his automobile. In the course of its opinion the court
said:
''The trial court denied several instructions
requested by defendant, to the effect that, in this
case all twelve of the jurors would have to find
beyond a reasonable doubt upon a specific act, or
the specific acts, or omission, or 01nissions, which
constituted criminal negligence and which proximately caused the deaths of the pers·ons named,
in order to find the defendant guilty, or, in other
words, that some of the jurors could not agree
on one or more of the acts alleged, and others of
the jurors, upon other acts, or act, omission, or
omissions, and find the defendant guilty. In
urging as error the trial court's failure to so
16
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instruct, the defendant re1ie~ upon several cases
decided by the Supreme Court of Utah, namely:
State Y. Bleazard, 103 Utah 113, 133 P. 2d 1000;
State Y. Rasunn1ssen, 92 Utah :i57, 68 P. 2d 176;
State Y. Johnson, 76 Utah 84,287 P. 909.
A reading of these cases and the later Utah
rases of State Y. Thon1pson, 110 Utah 11:\ 170 P.
2d 153, and State Y. Roedl, 107 Utah 538, 1.):) P. 2d
7-1:1. discloses that the Snpre1ne Court of Utah did
not so decide. It is not necessary tltef a .fu.ry, iu
order to find a verdict, should conc~tr in a si·ngle
riew of the transaction disclosed by the evidence.

If the conclusion may be justified upon either of
two interpretations of the evidence, the verdict
cannot be impeached by showing that a part of
the jury proceeded upon one interpretation, and
part upon the other. ~Iurray v. New York Life
Ins. Co., 96 N.Y. 614, 48 Am. Rep. 658; People v.
Sullivan, 173 N.Y. 122, 65 N.E. 989, 63 L.R.A.
353, 93 Am. St. Rep. 582; State v. Flathers, 57
S.D. 320, 232 N.W. 51, 72 A.L.R. 150, annotation
at 154.'' (Italics added.)
It is respectfully submitted that no prejudicial error
was committed by the Court by the manner in which
it instructed the jury as to the alleged acts of ·criminal
negligence and that in any event appellant may not c~m
plain because of his falure to request the Court to give
a clarifying instruction. By his own neglect the appellant may not lead the Court into an alleged prejudicial
error concerning which he later complains.

17
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III.
THE COURT PROPERLY REFUSED TO GIVE DEFENDANT'S REQUESTED INSTRUCTION NO. 2.

Defendant's Requested Instruction No.2 was as follows:
"You are instructed that tbe fact that an
automobile skids or slides while proceeding along
a wet or slippery street is no evidence that the
party is operating the same at an excessive rate
of speed or in a careless or negligent manner."
It is respectfully submitted that the. requested instruction was properly refused because it does not embody a
correct statement of the law. While skidding in and of
itself and in all circumstances does not necessarily constitute evidence of negligence, it is a factor to be considered along with all the other factors in arriving
at a determination as to whether or not the motorist
was guilty of negligence. A correct statement of the
doctrine generally accepted in cases of skidding is that
set forth in 5 Am. Jur. at page 654, as follows:
"Skidding, at least on a slippery pavement,
is not necessarily due to negligence. The mere
fact, therefore, that an automobile skids does
not, of itself, constitute evidence of negligence
upon the driver's part so as to render the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur applicable. Such skidding is not an occurrence of such uncommon or
unusual character that, unexplained, it furnishes
evidence of the driver's negligence.
The inquiry in cases of skldding is as to the
driver's conduct previous to such skidding. The
18
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speed of the autmnobile prior to the skidding and
the care in handling the automobile, particular}~'
in the application of brakes, are factors to be considered in detern1ining- whether or not tlwre was
an exercise of due care. This is particularly true
where statutory provisions are involved. Extremely slippery streets require correspondingly
greater care in operation."
In the case of Wallis v. NaJU/YYWJn, 61 Wyom. 231, 157
P. (2d) 285, the Supren1e Court of Wyoming announced
the following doctrine "'ith reference to skidding across
the center line of the highway:
'' ·It is likewise true that the skidding itself
is not ordinarily evidence of negligence, where it
skids across the center line of the road to the
left side thereof and collides with another; but
the burden ·is upon the driver on the wrong side
of the road to excuse or justify the violation of the
law of the road. Berry on Automobiles (4th Ed.);
1 Blashfield, Encyl. of Automobiles, page 414;
Chase v. Tingdale Bros., 127 Minn. 401, 149 N.W.
654; Petersen v. Pallis, 103 Wash. 180, 173 P.
1021; Thomas v. Adams, 174 Wash. 118, 24 P. 2d
432; Wilson v. Congdon, 179 Wash. 400, 37 P.
2d 892; Leonard v. Hey, 269 ~1ich. 491, 257 N.W.
733; Johnson v. Freemont Canning Co., 270 ~iich.
524, 259 N.W. 660.'
Both 2 Blashfield, Cyc. of Automobile Law,
Perm. Ed., Sec. 916, p. 58, and 3-4 Huddy, Cyc.
of Automobile Law, Sec. 109, p. 176, announce the
rule that skidding to the left side of .the road
cannot be excused 'if the skidding is due to the
negligent ac.ts or omissions of the motorist'."
(Italics added.)
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The attention of this Honorable Court is also invited to the extensive annotations on this same subject
in 58 A.L.R. 266 and 113 A.I.R. 1022. It is respectfully
submitted that no prejudicial error was committed by
the Court in refusing to instruct the jury in accordance
with defendant's Requested Instruction No. 2 which
was not a correct statement of the law.

CONCLUSION
Respondent respectfully submits that a review of
the entire record and the proceedings reveals that the
defendant, Jack L. Clark, was afforded a fair trial, in
accordance with established legal principles, which was
free from prejudicial error. A careful reading of the
transcript will reveal also that there is ample and sufficient evidence contained therein upon which the verdict
of the jury and the judgment of the court was based
and that therefore his conviction for the crime of involuntary manslaughter should be affirmed by this Honorable
Court.
Respectfully submitted,
CLINTON D. VERNON
Attorney Gener·al
QUENTIN L. R. ALSTON
Assista-nt Atto.rney General

Attorneys for Respondent
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